because entrepreneurs needed the power to pick the chartering state. Over the course of the nineteenth century they gradually acquired such power. Charters became available as of right early in the century, thus relieving promoters from the need to seek special legislative authorization to do business in the corporate form. 4 Firms gained authority to operate nationwide as a result of the Supreme Court's 1910 decision denying states the power to exclude foreign corporations. 5 Final liberation came when states ceased requiring a nexus with a firm's activities as a condition to granting a charter. 6 By the early twentieth century incorporators could (a) readily obtain charters; (b) know that internal affairs would be governed by the law of the chartering state; (c) operate in states other than the chartering state; and (d) refrain from operating in the chartering state. The result was that by the beginning of the twentieth century entrepreneurs enjoyed broad ability to select the law governing their firm's internal affairs.
The parties' ability to influence the forum was more limited. The state of incorporation would always be open to litigation in which the corporation was a defendant. But states other than the chartering states began to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations during the nineteenth century. 7 If the corporation was a plaintiff or co-defendant, moreover, it would be necessary for the court to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, making it more likely that suit would be brought in some other court where these defendants could be found. 8 Ironically, therefore, as entrepreneurs became more capable of selecting the law governing their firms' internal affairs, they lost assurance as to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the selection of a state for chartering purposes continued (and continues) to have an important influence on the forum that resolves disputes under the charter. 9 4 Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 135, 138-58 (1985) . 577-86 (1958) .
8 While chartering states had means for coercing corporate directors to submit to their jurisdiction (for example by requiring consent to jurisdiction as a condition for becoming directors), such efforts were not always undertaken and when undertaken were not always successful. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) .
9 Even in recent years, corporate litigation involving Delaware firms has tended to be brought in Delaware, notwithstanding the theoretical availability of other courts to resolve the dispute. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (1993) [hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS]. For a critique of the impact of the state of incorporation doctrine
The conditions for the development of a market for contracts took longer to develop. Throughout much of the history of American law, such a market was impracticable due to the interaction of two factors: courts often refused to enforce choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses; and even if the courts enforced them, these clauses offered only limited benefits.
Parties seeking to enforce choice-of-law clauses were required to convince the court that their choice was bonafide.' 0 This meant that the designated law had to have some reasonably close relationship with the contract itself, indicating that the parties had not sought to avoid the authority of an otherwise applicable law. In practice the parties were limited to place of contracting or place of performance. 11 Underlying the hostility towards choice-of-law clauses was the sense that they represented an impermissible usurpation of state power. This was the objection of Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, who condemned choice-of-law clauses as conferring the equivalent of legislative power on the contracting parties. 12 Even if courts had enforced choice-of-law clauses, moreover, the parties would have obtained only limited benefit. Then-applicable conflict of laws rules sought to impose clear standards for identifying the substantive law to be applied in contract cases. 1 3 Thus any court's application of choice of law rules was reasonably likely to result in the same state's law being applied. Even if conflict of law principles would select different laws the effect was likely to be slight, given the prevailing view that contracts were governed by general common law.
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Tyson, 15 which made general law applicable in diversity of citizenship cases involving commercial questions.
If in a case involving adversaries from different states the contract law of one state deviated from prevailing norms, the litigation was likely to be brought into federal court and there decided under general law. Accordingly, there was typically little benefit to selecting the law of any particular state because the case would be decided according to the same rules regardless of which state was chosen. Choice-of-law clauses would neither increase predictability nor opt into more desirable legal rules.
Forum-selection clauses also provided only limited benefits to contracting parties. Such clauses were usually effective to confer personal jurisdiction on the court selected by the parties, on the theory that the party consented to the court's authority. 16 And courts would enforce judgments or awards entered by tribunals to whose power the parties submitted. 7 But most courts refused to enforce forum-selection clauses which purported to vest exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere. The theory was that such clauses represented an "ouster" of judicial power.' 8 Efforts to circumvent this rule by making submission to the selected tribunal a condition precedent to a suit were generally unavailing. 19 Even if a court enforced forum-selection clauses, moreover, the effect would often be slight for reasons already mentioned: the selected tribunal would usually apply the same principles of substantive law as would have been applied in the original forum.
The current salience of choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses is due to changes in background rules. Courts became increasingly receptive to choice-of-law clauses.
The These developments in choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses created opportunities for contracting parties to select the law and forum to govern their affairs. Limitations remained, however, by virtue of the requirement that there be a relationship between the transaction and the chosen law and forum. This nexus requirement has not yet broken down for ordinary commercial contracts. However, several states have enacted statutes assuring that their law and forum will be available for major contracts regardless of the parties' other connections with the state. 33 Although these statutes do not guarantee results (other states may not respect them), they go a long way towards making choice of law and forum just as discretionary for commercial contracts as chartering is for incorporations.
II. THE APPEAL OF NEW YORK LAW
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that the preconditions for a market for contracts are now in place.
The empirical evidence mentioned above establishes that such a market is, in fact, in place, at least on the demand side: parties to major commercial contracts routinely select a forum to govern disputes under the contract, and often, although less frequently, select a forum. 34 But is there also a supply side to the market for contracts? Do states affirmatively seek to attract party choices of law and forum? This section presents evidence that states do compete for commercial contracts. In particular, this section demonstrates that New York-the most successful provider of law and forum for major contracts-in fact has, for the better part of a century, engaged in vigorous efforts to attract this business. 36 and by the New York Chamber of Commerce, an association of merchants which had offered general arbitration services since 1768. 37 But New York's ability to attract general arbitration business was significantly limited by the doctrine of revocability: pre-dispute arbitration agreements were considered to be revocable at will and thus were not specifically enforceable in court. When a dispute arose one party was likely to perceive advantages in going to court, either because he could benefit from delay or because he believed that general law offered a greater chance of success than principles of commercial usage. 38 The rule of revocability allowed a party to avoid arbitration by refusing to participate (if a defendant) or filing a lawsuit (if a plaintiff).
39
The rule of revocability was not a significant handicap for industry-specific arbitration tribunals because social pressure within the industry could substitute for the lack of legal enforceability of a predispute arbitration agreement. 40 But the New York Chamber of Commerce, as a general arbitration tribunal, could not rely on extralegal sanctions to ensure compliance. 41 Denied either specific Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924) (hereinafter "Joint Hearings") (testimony of Julius Cohen) ("the difficulty is that men do enter into such agreements and then afterwards repudiate the agreement").
40 See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 36, at 266 ("Systems of arbitration depending for their effectiveness wholly upon the moral suasion of the business community have grown up in the past decades in many lines of American business. Usually the most successful are to be found in the ranks of thoroughly organized trade associations which can exercise an effective discipline ... ").
41 Id. at 270 ("business has become so used to the doctrine of revocability of arbitration agreements that these clauses are not regarded in the same light as other contractual obligations").
performance or an effective extra-legal sanction, the disappointed party would be remitted, at best, to the inadequate remedy of damages for breach of the agreement to arbitrate. 42 These difficulties placed the Chamber at a distinct disadvantage in competition with specialized tribunals for the provision of arbitration services. 43 Developments elsewhere presented even greater threats to the Chamber's arbitration business.
England had made pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable by statute in 1886, 44 resulting in an increase in the caseload of the London Court of Arbitration 45 -no doubt at the Chamber's expense. 46 The Chamber also faced domestic competition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1913 that predispute arbitration clauses were enforceable notwithstanding a statute which purported to nullify them. 47 The result was that parties might opt for a Pennsylvania arbitrator in order to enhance prospects that arbitration agreements would be effective. 48 If other states followed Pennsylvania's lead the Chamber's pre-eminence in domestic arbitration would be jeopardized. 49 The Chamber of Commerce responded to these threats to its business. In 1911 it appointed a committee on arbitration under the leadership of Charles L. Bemheimer, a cotton trader, with the apparent objective of modernizing and improving the Chamber's arbitration services. Ably assisted by the Chamber's General Counsel Julius Henry Cohen, 50 Bernheimer revamped procedures and upgraded the arbitrator list.51 But these efforts provided only partial protection. The Chamber could not maintain its dominant position in commercial arbitration, over the long run, unless New York abandoned the rule of revocability.
The Chamber's hopes in this respect were disappointed in 1914 when the New York Court of Appeals decided Meacham v. Jamestown. 52 This was a lawsuit brought in New York by a Pennsylvania contractor against a Pennsylvania railroad for work done in Pennsylvania. The contract required the parties to submit disputes to the chief engineer before bringing suit. The trial court, in a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division, dismissed the case on the ground that under Pennsylvania law submission to the arbitrator was a mandatory precondition to suit. But the Court of Appeals rejected the clause on public policy grounds, thus allowing the litigation to go forward in New York. Judge Cardozo's concurring opinion made it clear that even if New York courts might defer to forum-selection clauses that called for adjudication, the same was not true for arbitration: "[i]f any exceptions to the general rule are to be admitted, we ought not to extend them to a contract where the exclusive jurisdiction has been bestowed, not on the regular courts of another jurisdiction that refused to enforce such agreements-as happened the following year. 49 The possibility of loss of business if Pennsylvania's innovation were followed elsewhere was not lost on New York judges: Judge Cardozo commented that if New York courts were to enforce arbitration agreements valid under Pennsylvania law, "jurisdiction over controversies arising under such contracts may be withdrawn from our courts and the litigation remitted to arbitrators in distant states." Meacham, 105 N.E. at 656 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 56 But overall the cases were a setback. They made it clear that the New York courts were not going to enforce arbitration clauses no matter where the proceedings were to be conducted. New York arbitrations would fail along with the rest. If recourse was to be had against the "deadly rule" 57 of revocability, it had to be through legislation.
58
Two groups joined to lobby for repeal. 59 The New York business community supported arbitration as a low-cost alternative to litigation as a means for resolving disputes. 60 Arbitration also received support 62 Here the leading figure was Julius Henry Cohen, whose work with Bernheimer had convinced him that commercial arbitrations were a natural extension of a lawyer's business. 63 England's repeal of the rule of revocability had resulted in a new and lucrative practice for attorneys there; 64 Cohen believed that similar benefits could be captured by New York lawyers. He argued that lawyers would be called to represent clients in arbitration just as much as in litigation. 65 Lawyers' business would even increase because clients would be induced to enforce their rights if given access to speedy and inexpensive procedures. 66 Satisfied clients would pay as much for arbitration as for litigation, no questions asked. 67 Even if the attorney's fee were slightly lower this would not matter because he also had lower expenses. 68 Overall the attorney would earn a better return.
69
Between 1915 and 1920 Cohen and others worked on three fronts, attempting to persuade business interests to accept attorneys as party representatives and arbitrators, to persuade lawyers to support arbitration as an alternative to litigation and to persuade the New York legislature to repeal the rule of revocability. 70 Their efforts eventually and their local subdivisions which agreed to promote arbitration).
61 For an account noting the role of attorneys in lobbying for arbitration reform, see Benson, supra note 17, at 491-92.
62 In fact, attorneys were responsible for the demise of a formal arbitration court authorized by the New York legislature in 1874 and abandoned in 1878. COHEN, BUILDED BETTER, supra note 51, at 152-53; see also Benson, supra note 17, at 491-92; KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 19 (resistance among lawyers to arbitration attributed to fear of "adverse effect upon the livelihood of bench and bar").
63 Arbitrations before the Chamber of Commerce were adversarial proceedings intended for the benefit of the broader business community. KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 9. Lawyers could often play a role in these proceedings as representatives of the parties or as paid arbitrators. In contrast, arbitrations before trade organizations rarely included attorneys and thus offered few benefits to lawyers and some costs, if disputes that would otherwise be tried in court were routed to an industry tribunal. 
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paid off: the New York legislature enacted a statute in 1920,11 heralding a "new era in American arbitration. 72 The New York statute survived the inevitable constitutional challenge. 73 But it did not provide complete protection for pre-dispute arbitration clauses. When the disputants were of diverse citizenship either could prevent enforcement, notwithstanding the New York statute, simply by taking the dispute to federal court, which continued to adhere to the rule of revocability. Given the Trinidad Lake case it was evident that protection from this risk could only come from Congress. The arbitration reform interests in New York therefore sought enactment of a federal law. 74 The campaign culminated in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 75 which, among other things, made pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court.
Another problem with the New York statute was that it did nothing to affect the laws of other states. Thus if a contract called for arbitration in New York City, the aggrieved party might avoid arbitration by suing the defendant in the courts of some state that did not enforce arbitration clauses. This problem was mitigated by the federal statute, since if the parties were of diverse citizenship either could ensure the clause was enforced by bringing the action into federal court. But even after 1925 the problem remained, albeit in reduced form, where the parties were not diverse and the plaintiff could obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in a state that preserved the doctrine of revocability. New York Charles L. Bemheimer, Chairman of the Committee of Arbitration of the New York Chamber of Commerce). Eventually the Chamber and the bar committee agreed on uniform rules for arbitration. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 35, at 11. The groups also worked for repeal of the revocability rule. Recognizing that any such law would face a constitutional challenge, they sought to obtain a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to act in the area, but were informed that no such amendment was needed. Id. at ix. In 1918, at the behest of the New York Chamber of Commerce, Cohen published a monograph which promoted the case for judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses. 
Now, in Alabama, Illinois, West Virginia, or California, do you want to take a written contract in which there is a little clause sneaked in the middle there that any disputes in this contract shall be submitted to arbitration, and another little clause, "All arbitration shall take place in New York and New Jersey?" [T] hat's what the net result of [other states' adopting the New York approach] will be. 85 The foregoing history shows that the campaign for modem arbitration laws was heavily concentrated in New York City. 86 The New York Chamber of Commerce lobbied for reform in order both to expand its status as the leading provider of general arbitration services and also to respond to competitive threats from London and other American states. Assisting or even leading this lobbying effort were New York attorneys who perceived a potentially valuable source of future business if arbitration agreements became enforceable in the state. The New York arbitration law of 1920 served the purpose of attracting arbitrations to New York (and avoiding losses of business to competitor jurisdictions). The subsequent campaign to project the New York statute to the federal government and other states, which was also spearheaded by New York interests, also can be understood as part of a competition for contracts.
These laws were needed to assure contracting parties that their choice of a New York arbitral forum would be respected even if a party wishing to avoid arbitration was able to direct litigation into some other forum.
New York legal and commercial interests worked together to maintain and enhance the attractiveness of New York as a forum for arbitration chosen by parties to commercial contracts.
B. Assurance of Law and Forum
Further evidence that New York competes for commercial contracts can be found in that state's treatment of contracts that select New York law or a New York forum. As would be expected of a state that competes for this business, New York is extraordinarily receptive to enforcing contracts that select New York as the provider of law or forum, even in cases where there are few or no other connections between New York and the contract or the parties.
New York courts presume that the law selected by the parties will be applied. 87 If otherwise enforceable under contract law principles, choice-of-law clauses will be respected unless they lack a reasonable relationship to the state or violate a fundamental public policy. 88 These exceptions are rarely (if ever) dispositive in New York commercial litigation. The "reasonable relationship" standard is satisfied if there are some contacts between the contract and the state, even if the contacts with another jurisdiction are greater. 89 Indeed, the parties' decision to select New York law in itself may constitute the requisite contact. 90 New York courts in commercial cases also strictly construe the principle that the parties' choice of law may be ignored if it violates a fundamental public policy. In applying this exception New York courts appear to consider the public policy of New York only. 91 Thus contracts selecting New York law appear to be immune from public policy challenge in New York. As to contracts selecting another state's laws, New York will refuse enforcement only when the chosen law would infringe some "fundamental principle of justice. '92 It is difficult to imagine that a New York court would often conclude that a decision by sophisticated commercial parties to subject themselves to the law of another state would fail this test. Indeed, because respecting the parties' choice of law is itself a policy of New York, 93 it may be doubted that such a choice would ever be considered against public policy.
94
Overall, therefore, it appears that choices of law in commercial cases will receive nearly absolute respect in New York courts. clauses. 96 Where differences exist, however, they tend to be in the direction of giving less effect to these clauses. The public policy exception to enforcement of choice-of-law clauses, for example, is interpreted in many jurisdictions to include the fundamental policy of states other than the forum. 97 This increases the likelihood that a court will reject the parties' choice on public policy grounds. States other than New York may also apply a more demanding concept of their own public policy: Texas 9 " and California 9 9 are examples. Some courts interpret choice-of-law clauses more narrowly than other contract terms, 10 0 reject them for particular classes of contracts, 10 1 disapprove them as not reflecting the real intent of the parties, 102 or refuse to recognize them if another state is found to have a materially greater interest in the matter.
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New York also favors party autonomy in forum selection. Arbitration agreements are vigorously enforced in New York, even when they foreclose class actions 104 or add nonstandard procedures. that they result from fraud or overreaching, are unreasonable or unfair, or contravene some strong public policy. 1 0 7 Such clauses are enforceable in New York even if they operate unilaterally to bind only one of the parties. 0 8 They are defeated by claims of fraud in the inducement only if the fraud alleged relates to the forum selection clause itself rather than to the contract generally. 1 0 9 Conclusory allegations of fraud or duress are insufficient; the complaining party must allege facts setting forth a strong showing that the complaining party was induced to agree to the forum-selection clause by fraud." I 0 Most other states enforce forum-selection clauses. But many do not provide the same level of assurance to the parties. Some courts retain jurisdiction over cases in which the parties have selected another state's forum if they conclude that their own tribunals would be more convenient."' Some are more willing to reject forum-selection clauses on grounds that they contravene public policy, 112 are unreasonable," l3 fail to establish personal jurisdiction in the forum, 1 14 or fail to accomplish "substantial justice. ' 1 15 Some approve forum-selection clauses only grudgingly, 116 reject them in particular types of cases, 117 exercise discretion over whether to enforce them, 1 8 or refuse to enforce them at all. 119
In the early 1980s the New York Bar Association became active in attempting to provide even greater assurances that party choices of law and forum will be respected in New York State. The committee deliberations were explicitly tied to the self interest of the state. A report of the Association's Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law recognized several advantages that flowed from New York's proven ability to attract contracts from other jurisdictions. Parties "not otherwise having substantial connections with New York" may be induced to conduct business in the state if they could be assured of a New York forum and New York law. 120 New York's "legal and business communities" would benefit "if significant agreements are governed by New York law and if significant commercial litigation is conducted in the state." 121 "New York's stature as a preeminent financial and commercial center" would be "preserved and ultimately enhanced."1 22 Also salient to the committee's deliberations was a concern that New York's dominance in the market for contracts could be threatened if the state failed to offer enhanced assurances that forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses would be respected. The committee warned that questions about the enforceability of New York choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses could deter parties from selecting New York law or forum.
123
The problem had become critical because "other international business centers" had taken "affirmative measures to attract foreign business by providing ready access to a competent forum for dispute resolution."' 124 The committee recommended, therefore, that "parties to significant commercial contracts should be encouraged to submit to the jurisdiction of the New York courts and to choose New York law as their governing law. 
C. Superior Adjudicative Services
A prominent theory of Delaware's success in the market for corporate charters is that the Delaware courts, and especially the Delaware Chancery Court, offer expert, prompt, and reliable judicial services for adjudicating corporate disputes. 32 Does a similar phenomenon exist in the case of the market for contracts? This section will illustrate how New York and other states compete for litigation (and forum selection clauses) by offering upgraded judicial services to major commercial parties.
Because of their location in the nation's most important commercial city, state and federal courts in Manhattan enjoy a natural advantage over other courts as preferred forums for the adjudication of business disputes. Even so, New York has labored under certain deficits as compared with Delaware in establishing its courts as national leaders in its chosen fields. Delaware Chancery Court judges are appointed for lengthy terms (twelve years) from a list submitted by a judicial advisory council. 133 They tend to be persons with experience in business law matters and good reputations among other lawyers and judges in the small world of the Delaware bar. New York trial court judges, on the other hand, have been selected by politicians whose interests are not necessarily consonant with identifying persons with extensive business law experience or sensitivity to the needs of international finance. 34 And while most New York state court judges are public servants of sterling character and outstanding reputations, this is not true for all.' 35 The problem faced by New York in supplying credible judicial services to contracting parties was not limited to unpredictable judges. Docketing practices employed in New York Supreme Court moved matters from judge to judge as the case progressed. 36 Backlogs were an issue. Businesses had to wait in line with all other civil litigants. Moreover, unlike the Delaware Chancery Court, which operates without a jury, an action for breach of contract for money damages would ordinarily be tried to a jury in New York. 37 Commercial interests frequently express dismay at the prospect of having their cases tried to a jury, on the theory that people drawn at random from a jury pool are unpredictable, unlikely to understand the complexities of a commercial case, and prone to deciding cases on the basis of extraneous factors. 38 Other things equal, the prospect of submitting a case to a New York jury might be considered a detriment to selecting New York as a forum. These and other problems resulted in substantial dissatisfaction among the business community with the judicial services provided in the New York state court system. 39 Given a choice, business litigators were likely to prefer to go to New York federal courts, 40 to the courts of another state such as Delaware, or to arbitration. 1 4 1 The bad repute of the New York state court system posed an obvious threat to New York's ability to compete for contracts. 142 New York addressed these problems in the 1990s under the leadership of Chief Judge Judith Kaye 43 and Robert L. Haig, a prominent New York attorney. 44 In 1993 the state instituted a pilot commercial court program in the New York County (Manhattan) Supreme Court. 14 5 The program designated a single judge for assignment to all aspects of a case, thus eliminating the revolving-door approach to judicial assignments that had characterized the New York system. Judging the experiment a success, the state established a permanent Commercial Division of the Supreme Court in 1995. 146 In addition to continuing the policy of assigning one judge to a case, the commercial division initiative enlisted judges and court personnel who were experienced in business law, implemented new case management techniques, and offered enhanced opportunities for court-annexed alternative dispute resolution. 1 47 The judges assigned to the commercial division serve fourteen-year terms. They are selected by the Chief Judge, and thus can be picked for their business law experience. 1 48 They develop a reputation for expertise that enhances their stature and also may improve their prospects for reelection. 49 Chief Judge Judith Kaye explained that the purpose of the commercial division is to give the New York business community a level of judicial service "commensurate with its status as the world financial capital."' 50
The commercial division has been deemed a success, at least by its promoters. The average time to resolve a contract action has reportedly been reduced. 151 Jury pools are said to be improved as a result of more intensive supervision by the commercial division judges. 152 Chief Judge Kaye reported that judges of the commercial division are contributing to a "growing body of commercial law once again being generated by the New York State courts."' 1 53 The court has "helped to stem the flight of commercial litigants from New York's courts, and to maintain New York's status as the premier state for the conduct of business. '154 Other Maryland, 158 Colorado, 159 Florida, North Carolina, 160 Nevada, 161 and Oklahoma. 162 An ad hoc committee of the American Bar Association has also endorsed the idea. 163 Even staid Delaware has entered the competition as a result of the expansion of Chancery Court jurisdiction to include technology disputes.
area of lender liability. Actual rather than constructive knowledge is the standard in New York for proof of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. 170 Thus lenders will typically enjoy a defense against claims by shareholders that they facilitated breaches of trust by corporate managers. Similarly, New York law is unfriendly to the tort of deepening insolvency, under which a lender can be held responsible for actions that permit an insolvent firm to continue in operation while losses mount.' 7 ' Under New York law, lenders can generally avoid liability for extending credit to a firm in the zone of insolvency even if the loans are ill-considered and contribute to creditor losses.1 7 2
The state's approach to traded financial contracts provides another example of efforts to meet the needs of the finance industry. 7 3 New York's Statute of Frauds had long required that certain widely used financial contracts had to be signed by the party to be bound in order to represent enforceable obligations.1 74 This presented a problem because such contracts were typically made orally. Although commercial usage was to treat them as legally binding at the time of the agreement, the law technically allowed either party to avoid the transaction. Even though it appears that social norms among traders prevented people from relying on this avenue to escape their obligations, there was always the possibility of breakdown in the event of market disruptions. In response to this problem, New York revised its Statute of Frauds in 1994 to provide alternative means for establishing the enforceability of agreements for the purchase and sale of currencies, commodities, foreign exchange, deposits and options, indexes and similar instruments. 75 The New York Legislature expanded the provision in 2002 to include institutional sales of commercial loans by means of telephone or oral communications. [Vol. 30:5 CONCLUSION This paper documents the evidence of a market for contracting with particular focus on the role of New York as the leading provider of law and forum. New York law is the most frequently selected by sophisticated parties to govern important agreements. Its courts, too, are designated far more frequently than any other state's as forums for resolving disputes.
The paper demonstrates that New York's dominance is not accidental. For the better part of a hundred years the state has engaged in affirmative and successful efforts to induce parties to select New York as the provider of law and forum for large commercial contracts.
